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Insider Trading with Imperfectly Competitive
Market Makers
Abstract. We extend a market model of Kyle (1984) to a multi-period mar-
ket model in which market makers are imperfectly competitive. When there
are only a finite number of market makers who try to maximize their expected
profits, Kyle’s λ, price sensitivity to the order flow, is higher than that of Kyle
(1985), who assumes perfect competition among risk-neutral market makers.
We show that in a multi-period setting, the price movement has a negative
serial correlation as Roll (1984) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
Keywords: Kyle’s model, imperfectly competitive market makers, negative
serial correlation.
1 Introduction
The problem of market making and insider trading has been studied extensively in the
market microstructure literature. In his seminal paper, Kyle (1985) analyzed three types
of market models; a one-shot model, a multi-period model, and a continuous-time model.
He examined the market characteristics such as market liquidity and informational effi-
ciency when a monopolistic informed trader behaves strategically. He showed that there
exists a linear equilibrium in which the informed trader with long-lived private informa-
tion trades in a gradual manner, and that market liquidity and informational efficiency
are dependent on the variances of the liquidation value and of noise trades.
In Kyle (1985), the market maker is assumed to be risk-neutral and perfectly com-
petitive, which implies that the conditional expected profit of the market maker is zero.
Under this assumption, the price set by the market maker is given by
p = E[v|F ],
where F is the information available to the market maker. Most of the subsequent liter-
ature building on Kyle’s model follow the assumption of a risk-neutral and competitive
market maker (e.g., see Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1996), and Back
et al. (2000)). This assumption leads to the result that the price in a multi-period setting
satisfies a martingale property with respect to the information available to the market
maker. In this case, the price change has no serial correlation.
In this paper, we present a Kyle-type market model where there are a finite number
of imperfectly competitive market makers who are all risk-neutral. If a market maker sets
the demand-price schedule more favorable for other traders, she gains less profit per unit
trade, but can attract more trades. Market makers try to maximize their expected profit,
while taking into account the effect of their own demand-price schedule on other traders’
strategies.
An important issue arisen is how the characteristics of the market-making system
affect the market equilibrium. On the so called “Black Monday” in 1987, most market
makers in NASDAQ stopped dealing and the liquidity became scarce. On the other hand,
specialists in New York Stock Exchange were compulsory for the market-making and so
other traders can sell stocks to them. As a result, some of the specialists ran out of
money.1 This difference was said to be caused in part by the system of market-making.
Another example to show the importance of market-making is the scandal of possible
1See, for example, Barro et al. (1989).
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abuses by some specialists that match buyers and sellers on the floor of the New York
Stock Exchange.
The investigation of competition among market makers is not new. Kyle (1984) ana-
lyzed a one-shot model with a finite number of market makers who are risk-neutral and
aim to maximize their expected profits. He showed in his paper that the price sensitivity
is decreasing with the number of market makers. We extend Kyle (1984) to a multi-period
setting in which multiple market makers set their demand-price schedule, and clear or-
ders by an informed trader and noise traders. Our major interest is how the imperfect
competition among market makers affects the price behavior during the trading periods.
One of the major contributions in this paper is to show that in a multi-period setting,
the time-series of the price change is negatively correlated, and the price movement has
permanent and temporary impacts. This result echoes some of the existing works. For
example, Roll (1984) showed in his simple model that the price has a negative serial
correlation when the fundamental value of a risky asset is between the ask and bid prices,
and the probability that the buy order arrives is equal to the probability of sell orders.
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) obtained a similar result that when the market making needs
some fixed cost for the market maker Holthausen et al. (1987) mentioned that there are
three potential explanations for price changes: (i) liquidity costs, (ii) inelastic demand
curves, and (iii) information effects. Thanks to the imperfect competition, each market
maker can gain positive expected profit. When we regard the profit of market makers as
some costs associated with market-making, the negative autocorrelation in our setting is
consistent with previous theoretical papers.
There are some empirical papers which report some resilient effects in price, especially
when price drops. Holthausen et al. (1987) and Holthausen et al. (1990) discovered
that for seller-initiated transactions, there is evidence of negative correlations and tem-
porary effects. Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) showed that when volatility is rather high,
price returns exhibit negative autocorrelation. These empirical evidences can be partly
explained by the imperfect competition among market makers.
We also extend the model to the cases of multiple informed traders in Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1992), and of risk-averse informed traders in Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1994). In the case of a monopolistic informed trader, the price change is negatively
correlated in these two settings.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review Kyle (1984), a one-shot
model with imperfectly competitive market makers in order to make our discussion clear.
We extend in Section 3 the one-shot model to a multi-period one, and show that the
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price change has permanent and temporary effects. We also demonstrate that our model
converges to the result of the multi-period model in Kyle (1985) as the number of market
makers goes to infinity. In Section 4, we discuss some extensions of our model. Section 5
concludes this paper.
2 A One-Shot Model
In this section, we review the model of Kyle (1984). The model consists of only two
dates, time 0 and time 1. At time 0, market participants trade a risky asset based on
their information, while at time 1, the payoff of the risky asset is realized and consumption
occurs.
In the underlying market, one risk-free asset and one risky asset are traded by three
types of market participants: a monopolistic informed trader who is risk-neutral and pos-
sesses private information about the payoff of the risky asset, noise traders who participate
in the market for exogenous reasons, and risk-neutral market makers who set the price
schedule based on the market orders by other traders. For simplicity, the risk-free interest
rate is assumed to be zero. We denote by v the payoff of the risky asset. We assume that
v follows a normal distribution with mean µ0 and variance Σ0. The ex ante distribution
of the payoff is publicly known.
The monopolistic informed trader observes the liquidation value v before the market
opens. However, the informed trader cannot observe the realized market price or the
demand of other traders, and only submits a market order x based on v.
The assumption of noise traders is the same as other previous articles. We denote
the cumulative order amount of noise traders by u, and assume that u follows a normal
distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2u, and is independent of all other random variables.
There are M market makers in the market who are indexed by m = 1, . . . , M . Market
makers are all risk-neutral, i.e., each market maker maximizes her conditional expected
profits. Contrary to the informed trader, market makers can submit a limit order which
depends on the market price p. This means that market maker m provides a demand-
price schedule dm = dm(p). As we see below, observing the price p is equivalent to
observing x + u, the total order amount by the informed trader and noise traders. We
define y := x + u.
A market equilibrium is characterized by a trading strategy of the informed trader and
demand-price schedules of market makers.
3
Definition 1 An equilibrium is defined as a set (x, {dm}
M
m=1) satisfying the following
three conditions:
1. Profit Maximization of the Informed Trader: The trading strategy x is determined
so that the informed trader maximizes his conditional expected profit
E[(v − p)x|v].
2. Profit Maximization of Market Makers: The demand-price schedule dm is determined
so that the market maker m maximizes her conditional expected profit
E[(v − p)dm|p], (2.1)
for m = 1, . . . , M .




dm = 0. (2.2)
In this setting, Kyle (1984) obtained the following theorem.



















(µ0 − p), (2.4)
for m = 1, . . . , M .
Proof See Kyle (1984).
Theorem 1 provides some properties of the market with imperfectly competitive market
makers. For the informed trader, the market price is of the form



















indicates Kyle’s λ is monotonically decreasing with respect to the number of market
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, which is obtained
in Kyle (1985), and the price satisfies
p = E[v|y].
The aggregated expected profits of market makers are given by








When M →∞, the total expected profit converges to zero.
The above analysis confirms that the market model actually converges to the one-shot
model of Kyle (1985) when the number of market makers goes to infinity.
3 A Multi-Period Model
In this section, we extend the model of one-shot trading to a multi-period model. Trading
of a risky asset takes place in N sequential auctions in a time interval which begins at
t = 0 and ends at time t = 1. Let tn be the time at which the nth auction takes place.
As in Kyle (1985), we assume
0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = 1,
and define ∆tn := tn − tn−1.
As in the previous section, the value of the risky asset is normally distributed with
mean µ0 and Σ0. The ex ante distribution of v is public information, but the realization
of v is only observed by the informed trader before the market opens.
Denote the total order quantity of noise traders by un, and define ∆un := un − un−1.
We assume that ∆un is serially uncorrelated and is normally distributed with zero mean
and variance of σ2u∆tn. We also assume that the process {un} is independent of all other
random variables.
Let xn be the position of the risky asset held by the informed trader at time tn,
and let ∆xn denote the quantity traded by the informed trader at the nth auction, i.e.,
∆xn := xn − xn−1. At each auction, the informed trader chooses the optimal ∆xn based
on the realization of v and the history of the market price. As in the previous section,
the informed trader cannot observe the realization of the market price before submitting
his order, i.e., he only submits a market order at each auction.
Denote by dmn the position of the risky asset by the market maker m at time tn, and
∆dmn the order quantity at time tn, i.e., ∆dmn := dmn − dmn−1. Each market maker
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chooses her order quantity based on {y1, . . . , yn}, the history of the total order flow from
the informed trader and noise traders.
Let Fn be the sigma field generated by {y1, . . . , yn}. As in the previous section, we
easily see from the discussion below that observing {y1, . . . , yn} is equivalent to observing
{p1, . . . , pn}. The information Fn is public information just before each market maker
submit her limit order at the nth auction.






m=1) such that the
following conditions hold:
1. Profit Maximization of the Informed Trader: For all n = 1, . . . , N , the trading
strategy of the informed trader {xk}
N






2. Profit Maximization of Market Makers: For all m = 1, . . . , M and n = 1, . . . , N ,
the trading strategy of market maker m {dmk}
N














∆dmn = 0. (3.2)
Figure 1 provides the time line of this market model. First, the informed trader
submits a market order ∆xn based on v and {p1, . . . , pn−1}. Second, noise traders submit
∆un for exogenous reasons. Third, market maker m submits a limit order ∆dmn(pn) based
on {y1, . . . , yn}. Finally, the market clears such that (3.2) is satisfied.
Figure 1 is inserted here.
We now state a theorem which provides the difference equation system characterizing
the equilibrium.
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Theorem 2 Define µn := E[v|Fn], and κ :=
M−2
M−1
. For M ≥ 3, there exists a linear
equilibrium, in which there are constants αn, βn, λn and Σn such that for




(µn−1 − pn), m = 1, . . . , M
Σn = Var[v|Fn]
and
E[pin|v,Fn−1] = αn−1(v − µn−1)
2 + δn−1.
Given Σ0, the constants αn, βn, λn and Σn are the solution to the difference equation
system
αn−1 =
1 + 4(1− κ)αnλn
4λn(1− κ2αnλn)
, (3.3)
























subject to αN = δN = 0 and the second order condition
λn(1− κ
2αnλn) > 0.
The conditional expectation µn satisfies
µn = µn−1 + κλn∆yn.
Proof The proof has three steps. First, we derive optimality conditions of the informed
trader given his value function and market makers’ strategy. At the second step, the
optimality condition for each market maker is obtained under the linear strategy of other
players. Finally, we confirm that the conditions obtained in the first and second steps are
consistent and lead to the statement in the proof.
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Step 1: Optimality conditions for the informed trader Suppose that the informed
trader conjectures that each market maker trades at the nth auction according to the
following strategy:
∆dmn = ξn(µn−1 − pn), m = 1, . . . , M, (3.8)
where µn satisfies
µn = µn−1 + θn∆yn (3.9)
for some constant θn.
2 Now we proceed by backward induction. Assume for some con-
stants αn and δn, the value function of the informed trader is given by
max E[pin|v,Fn−1] = αn−1(v − µn−1)
2 + δn−1. (3.10)
Note that from (3.2) and (3.8), the price can be expressed as





max E[pin|v,Fn−1] = max
∆x






















(v − µn−1), (3.12)




Plugging (3.12) into (3.11), we obtain
αn−1 =

















2More formally, we should initially set µn = µn−1 + θn∆yn + h to derive a linear equilibrium, and
then show that h = 0 as in Kyle (1985) or Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992). However, we skip the
procedure since it seems tedious and not so important.
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Step 2: Optimality conditions for market makers Suppose that the market maker
m conjectures that for n = 1, . . . , N , the informed trader trades according to the following
strategy
∆xn = βn(v − v¯n−1)∆tn, (3.17)
and other market makers adopt the following strategy
∆dkn = ξn(v¯n−1 − pn), k 6= m, (3.18)
where v¯n is the expected value of v conditional on {y1, . . . , yn}, i.e. v¯n := E[v|Fn]. Let Σn
be the conditional variance of v given Fn. Then, from the projection theorem of normal
distributions, v¯n and Σn are given by






























Next, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Assume (3.17) and (3.18). Then, the optimal strategy of each market maker
is myopic in the sense that they only maximize the expected profit of each trading period.
Proof of Lemma 1 From (3.2), the price at tn+1 is written as
pn+1 = v¯n +
1
(M − 1)ξn+1
[βn(v − v¯n)∆tn+1 + ∆un+1 + ∆dmn+1]. (3.20)
Since v¯n = E[v|∆y1, . . . , ∆yn] is Fn-measurable and independent of ∆dmn, the strategies of
the informed trader and other market makers at tn+1 are independent of ∆dmn from (3.17)
and (3.18), respectively. Then, from (3.20), we see that pn+1 is independent of ∆dmn. We
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can show in a recursive way that pn+k is independent of dmn for k = 1, . . . , N − k. The
lemma follows readily. 
From the market clearing condition (3.2), the market price for market maker m is
written as
pn = v¯n−1 +
1
(M − 1)ξn
(∆dmn + ∆yn). (3.21)
Then, the expected profit of the market maker m at time tn is expressed as










The first order condition of (3.22) is
∆dmn = (M − 1)ξn (v¯n − pn) ,












Furthermore, the market clearing condition (3.2) yields
∆yn = −∆dm − (M − 1)ξn(µn−1 − pn). (3.24)










Step 3: Solution of the equilibrium Since the strategy of market makers is sym-













Now, suppose that θn = κλn and µn = v¯n. We can easily confirm that the value
function of the informed trader is actually given by (3.10). Substituting θn = κλn into
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(3.13) - (3.16) and (3.19), we obtain the difference equations system. Now the proof is
completed. 
We easily confirm that when M goes to infinity, the simultaneous differential equations
converge to that of Kyle (1985). Hence, as in a one-shot model, our model in a multi-
period setting is actually an extension of Kyle (1985).
From Theorem 1, κ can be thought of as a parameter representing how competitive
market makers are. As κ approaches 1, the competition among market makers becomes
fierce, and the market is close to Kyle (1985).
We provide the numerical example when N = 5 and ∆tn = 0.2 for n = 1, . . . , 5. Other
parameters are given by µ0 = 0, Σ
(0) = 10, and σu = 1, respectively.
Figure 2 depicts λ, and Figure 3 graphs Σ in the case of M = 3, 5, and ∞.
Figure 2 is inserted here.
Figure 3 is inserted here.
The figures illustrate how the competition affects the market liquidity and the in-
formational efficiency. It is clear that both λ and Σ are decreasing with the number of
market makers. When M = 3, λ is about 1.8 times as much as that in the case M = ∞.
On the other hand, λ in the case M = 10 is around 1.1 times compared to λ in the case
of M = ∞. Since the intensity of the competition among market makers is represented
by κ = M−2
M
, the market equilibrium is not so different from that in Kyle (1985) when M
is large enough.
When the number of market makers is small, market makers set their price schedules
to be more sensitive to the order amount, and earn more expected profits. In this case, the
monopolistic informed trader trades less intensively. Therefore, the information owned
by the informed trader is not incorporated into the price as in the case of the perfect
competition, and the market becomes less efficient informationally. This result can be
seen from Figure 3.
Theorem 2 leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The price has a negative serial correlation.
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Proof From Theorem 2,








λn[βn(v − µn−1)∆tn + ∆un] + λn+1[βn+1(v − µn)∆tn+1 + ∆un+1].
Thus, we have








from the chain rule of conditional expectations. 
Holthausen et al. (1987) categorized price impact into three groups: (i) liquidity
costs, (ii) inelastic demand curves, and (iii) information effects. The first two effects




information effect, which is caused by updating the expectations by market makers. The





. By setting the price sensitivity to be
higher, market makers can earn a profit from noise traders.
Some empirical studies have found that price movements have permanent and tem-
porary impacts. Our model effectively explains how permanent and temporary effects
are caused. To illustrate the permanent and temporary impacts, we provide a numerical
example in Figure 4. The number of auctions is five, and the parameters are the same as
in the previous numerical example. The aggregated order at each auction is given by 1,
0, -1, -1, and 0. The price processes in the case of M = 3, 5, and ∞ are as follows.
Figure 4 is inserted here.
Although the order at t2 = 0.4 is zero, the price decreases when M = 3 and 5. This is
because the price increases at t1 has a temporary effect. The price increase at t5 is also
caused by the temporary effect of ∆p4 = p4 − p3. The figure illustrates the overshooting
and the resilience of the price in a market with imperfectly competitive market makers.
4 Some Extensions
In this section, we discuss some extensions of our model.
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4.1 Multiple informed traders
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) studied a Kyle-type market model with multiple in-
formed traders. We extend our model to such a setting.
The market opens at t = 0 and ends at t = 1, and trading takes place at t1 <
· · · < tN = 1. We assume that there are I informed traders who privately observe
the payoff of a risky asset before the market opens. We index each informed trader by
i = 1, . . . , I. Informed traders are risk-neutral in the sense that they maximize their
conditional expected profit as (3.1).
As in the case of a monopolistic informed trader, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Let µn = E[v|Fn] and κ :=
M−1
M−2
. When M ≥ 3, there exists a linear
equilibrium, in which there are constants αn, βn, λn and Σn such that for




(µn−1 − pn), m = 1, . . . , M,
Σn = Var[v|Fn]
and
E[piin|v,Fn−1] = αn−1(v − µn−1)
2 + δn−1.
Given Σ0, the constants αn, βn, ξn and Σn are the solution to the difference equation
system
αn−1 =
1 + [1− 2κ + 2I(1− κ2) + I(1− κ)2]αnλn
λn[(I + 1)− 2Iκ2αnλn]2
,



























The conditional expectation µn satisfies




It is worth noting that when M = ∞, the simultaneous equations in Theorem 3
coincide with those obtained by Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992).
4.2 Risk-Averse Informed Traders
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) studied a multi-period model with multiple risk-averse
informed traders. We here extend our model to the case of imperfectly competitive market
makers.
Assume that I informed traders all have a exponential utility with risk-aversion coef-




∣∣ v] , i = 1, . . . , I,
where WiN :=
∑N
n=1(v − pn)∆xin denotes the final wealth of the informed trader i. As
Proposition 1 in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994), we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4 When M ≥ 3, there exists a unique linear equilibrium in which there are
constants αn, βn, λn, Σn, and γn, characterized by the following:









Given Σ0, the constants αn, βn, λn, Σn, and γn are the solution of the simultaneous
equation system











1− 2αnθn − 2Aαnθn(λn − θn)σ
2
u∆tn
























In this paper, we have studied a Kyle-type market model in which imperfectly competitive
market makers set the price and clear the market. When market makers are imperfectly
competitive, the price sensitivity is higher than that of Kyle (1985), the case of perfectly
competitive market makers. In the multi-period setting, the price movement has perma-
nent and temporary effects, and is negatively correlated in its time-series. This means
that imperfect competition of market makers causes a overshooting and resilience of the
market price.
Empirical papers such as Holthausen et al. (1987) discovered that the price change
has permanent and temporary impacts, especially for seller-initiated transactions. The
findings obtained in this paper indicate that the two types of price impacts can be partially
explained by the imperfect competition among market makers.
We should note that this paper has not studied a continuous-time setting. When






It is not clear whether the above stochastic process is well-defined. The continuous-time
model will be investigated in future research.
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Notations Order Type Observables
∆xn Market order by Informed Trader {v, p1, . . . , pn−1}
∆un Order by Noise Traders Exogenous reasons
∆dmn Limit order by Market Maker m {y1, . . . , yn}
Figure 2: Price sensitivity to the order λ over the 5 trading periods. The market liquidity
















Figure 3: Informational efficiency Σ over the 5 trading periods. The figure shows that Σ















Figure 4: Price process over the 5 trading periods by a monopolistic informed trader. The
figure effectively illustrates the permanent and temporary price impacts.
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